Enabling efficient application monitoring in cloud data centers using
  SDN by Elsaadawy, Mona et al.
Enabling efficient application monitoring in cloud
data centers using SDN
Mona Elsaadawy
Bettina Kemme
mona.elsaadawy@mail.mcgill.ca
Kemme@cs.mcgill.ca
School of Computer Science, McGill University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Mohamed Younis
younis@cs.umbc.edu
Department of Computer Science and Electrical
Engineering, UMBC
Baltimore, Maryland, USA
Abstract
Software Defined Networking (SDN) not only enables agility
through the realization of part of the network functionality
in software but also facilitates offering advanced features at
the network layer. Hence, SDN can support a wide range of
middleware services; network performance monitoring is an
example of these services that are already deployed in prac-
tice. In this paper, we exploit the use of SDNs to efficiently
provide application monitoring functionality. The recent
rise of complex cloud applications has made performance
monitoring a major issue. We show that many performance
indicators can be inferred from messages exchanged among
application components. By analyzing these messages, we
argue that the overhead of performance monitoring could
be effectively moved from the end hosts into the SDN mid-
dleware of the cloud infrastructure which enables more flex-
ible placement of logging functionality. This paper explores
several approaches for supporting application monitoring
through SDN. In particular, we combine selective forwarding
in SDN to enable message filtering and reformatting, and
propose a customized port sniffing technique. We describe
the implementation of the approach within the standard
SDN software, namely OVS. We further provide a compre-
hensive performance evaluation to analyze advantages and
disadvantages of our approach, and highlight the trade-offs.
CCS Concepts • Networks→ Network measurement;
Network performance analysis; Data center networks; Pro-
grammable networks.
Keywords Software defined networking, Application log-
ging, Openflow, Network function virtualization
1 Introduction
Many application domains have started to move their ser-
vices into the cloud, e.g.,e-commerce, health management,
education, entertainment, and many more. Many cloud ap-
plications are often deployed as multi-component systems
where the individual components and their replicas might
run across tens, hundreds or even thousands of nodes and
may communicate with other similarly distributed services
to accomplish their goals. For example, user-facing compo-
nents at Google comprise 100s to 1000s of nodes that interact
with each other andwith other services (e.g., a spell-checking
service) to handle user requests. Even simple web applica-
tions today consist of multiple distributed tiers that interact
with each other and may be integrated with a third party
such as Facebook, payment gateways, etc. to accomplish
one transaction. The performance of these applications has
a direct impact on business metrics such as revenue and
customer satisfaction. Examples of this impact are well docu-
mented. For example, Google loses 20% traffic for additional
delay of 0.5 second to their page-load time and Amazon
loses 1% of revenue for every 100 ms in latency increase [17].
Given the distributed character of the applications, effective
logging and monitoring are important to keep track of per-
formance, and to detect, diagnose and resolve performance-
related problems.
Apart of standard hardware resource utilization measure-
ments (CPU, memory, etc.), application layer metrics such as
request service time or characteristics of service call distri-
butions are also highly relevant [20]. Common approaches
to collect the relevant data are to instrument the application
or the underlying platform to create log messages, such as
Apache Tomcat’s log valves [12]. An obvious disadvantage
is the application and/or platform dependence. Additionally,
network monitoring middleware tools such as Wireshark
[35], that perform live tracking of message flows and allow
for sophisticated analysis of captured packages, can be used
to perform some application-level performance assessment,
such as request response times. These tools attach to any
software component or to the hypervisor and are able to
observe all incoming and outgoing messages. What is com-
mon among all these approaches is that they generate the
logging information on the end-hosts. The tools themselves
can then either additionally perform the analysis, write the
logging information to a file to be analyzed later, or send the
logs to specialized analysis systems that run on a different
set of hosts. In any case, application performance may be af-
fected by sharing the host resources with the logging and/or
analysis tasks.
In contrast to these traditional solutions, this paper ex-
plores how some of the application monitoring functionality
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can be moved to the network layer by taking advantage
of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Func-
tion Virtualization (NFV). SDN separates data and control
flow, and NFV allows software implementations of network
functionality. In fact, SDN already provides some support
for targeted network monitoring such as bandwidth and
message statistics for individual flows. SDN and NFV are
invaluable for cloud data centers; according to Cisco’s No-
vember 2018 cloud index report[5] 1/3 of cloud data center
have partially or fully adopted SDN and 2/3 will do so by
2021. By then SDN and NFV traffic volume will make up
50% of the data traffic within the data center. Given such fast
adoption, we believe it is important to explore how much
SDN can be exploited as a low-level middleware to support
cloud-wide application monitoring.
We have been inspired to do so by a number of recent stud-
ies that explore the feasibility of performing a more global
network monitoring approach based on SDN [14, 26, 39].
The most basic approach is to enable the port mirroring fea-
ture in switches and routers, in such a way that they mirror
application traffic to specialized analysis systems. That is,
messages are duplicated at the network component, and the
actual analysis takes place somewhere else. Although such
an approach is simple, and does not impose major compu-
tational overhead at the switch/router, the message traffic
overhead can be significantly high. Such overhead can be
reduced by filtering messages at the SDN switches/routers
using forwarding rules that ensure that only packets that
are important for monitoring are mirrored to the specialized
analysis system. The disadvantage of selective mirroring is
that it might lead to a delay in the forwarding path.
Other research [4, 10, 15, 25, 34, 37] extends the source
code of the SDN switch to have an inclusive analysis func-
tion. However, the results show significant performance
degradation in terms of the modified SDN switch forwarding
throughput. In this paper, we have a closer look at some of
these approaches and see how they can be adjusted to work
for application monitoring. In particular, we analyze how
effective selective mirroring is able to truly filter only rele-
vant messages. We also provide insight into the performance
implications.
Furthermore, driven by the deployment limitations of ex-
isting approaches, we propose a conceptually different so-
lution that can be used for software switches which run
on general purpose hardware. Such software switches are
often deployed at rack-level and/or for the VMs/containers
hosted on the samemachine. In our solution, we decouple the
monitoring functionality from the switch forwarding path
by developing a monitoring middleware component that
runs on the switch node, yet it is only loosely coupled with
the switch functionality. We show in this paper how such a
loosely coupled approach offers a flexible and adjustable inte-
gration of application monitoring and analysis functionality
into the switch. In particular, we explore two variants of our
middleware. The first does the required complete analysis
locally on the switch host. The other performs some filtering
and pre-processing of messages and then sends the neces-
sary information to an analysis node, similar in concept to
the selective mirroring approach described above.
In summary, the contribution of this paper is as follows:
• We analyze various approaches in which network com-
ponents are used in support of application monitoring,
outlining their advantages and disadvantages.
• We propose a solution in which monitoring function-
ality is loosely integrated into software-based switch
components, allowing for a flexible and adjustable de-
ployment of application-based monitoring and analy-
sis.
• We have implemented and evaluated our proposed
solutions, and compared them against existing mon-
itoring solutions that are deployed on the end-hosts
on which the application is running. Our evaluation
is based on the YCSB benchmark and analyzes the
corresponding trade-offs in terms of impact on the ap-
plication performance, general resource consumption,
switching speed and communication overhead.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides background about SDNs, cloud network architectures
and traditional end-host based application monitoring. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 present our network-based application moni-
toring solutions. Specifically, Section 3 focuses on the role
of the software switch and how relevant information can
be filtered and transmitted to the monitoring component.
Section 4 then explains how application-relevant data can be
inferred from the individual messages. Section 5 discusses
the validation methodology and report the performance re-
sults. Section 6 present related work and Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 Background
2.1 Software Defined Networking
In Software Defined Networking, the SDN controller repre-
sents the control plane that decides on how messages are
routed and SDN switches represent the forwarding plane
(data plane) that guide messages through the network. The
controller provides each switch with a set of rules indicating
how to forward the different flows of messages they receive
from end hosts or other switches. A flow is typically identi-
fied by a set of IP header fields. Forwarding rules can change
over time as the controller dynamically customizes how to
route individual flows. OpenFlow – the de facto standard
of SDN – is an API used for exchanging control messages
between the controller and switches.
Each SDN switch has one or multiple flow tables, config-
ured by the SDN controller through the OpenFlow API. A
flow table contains rules to match incoming flows and/or
packets with certain actions such as prioritization, queuing,
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Figure 1. Articulation of a sample cloud network architec-
ture
packet forwarding and dropping. The following is an exam-
ple of a flow table rule, consisting of a set of conditions and
actions to execute when the conditions are met:
Conditions:
TCP-protocol, Source-IP=A.A.A.A, Source-Port=X,
Destination-IP=B.B.B.B, Destination-port=Y
Actions: output to out1
The rule will send the Acks of TCP messages sent from port
X of machine with IP A.A.A.A to port Y of machine with IP
B.B.B.B to out1, which is the switch’s ports that is connected
to the target destination.
Network functions, such as packet switching but alsomore
complex tasks, such as intrusion detection, load balancers
and firewalls, are traditionally implemented as custom hard-
ware appliances, where software is tightly coupled with
specific proprietary hardware. Network function virtualiza-
tion has been recently proposed to provide more agile and
cheaper networks. This means that network functions – such
as packet switching – can be implemented as an instance of
a middleware software that is decoupled from the underly-
ing hardware, and running on standardized compute nodes.
OpenVswitch (OVS) is one of the widely used virtualized soft-
ware switches in today’s cloud data centers. Various cloud
computing platforms and virtualization management have
been integrated with OVS, including OpenStack, openQRM,
OpenNebula and oVirt.
2.2 Cloud network architecture
A typical cloud data center network architecture today con-
sists of a 2-3 layer tree of switches and/or routers (e.g.,
Fat Tree [1]), such as shown in Figure 1. Hardware packet
switches are being used in the core network where low la-
tency is a must. In contrast, optimized software switches
(e.g., OVS integrated with DPDK[8], that accelerates packet
processing workloads running on general-purpose CPU), are
largely deployed as top-of-rack (TOR) switches [2, 16, 24,
30]. OVS is also used within high-end server machines that
host many virtual machines and/or containers where the
Monitoring Approaches
End host Network component 
Port mirror
Instrumentation Sniffer instrumentation
Selective forwarding
Port sniffer Hardware resource
 measures
Figure 2. Categorization of application monitoring ap-
proaches
OVS instance routes the messages exchanged between the
VMs/containers running within this same machine.
2.3 Traditional Application monitoring
A distributed cloud application might be be spread across
many nodes as illustrated in Figure 1, where the client re-
quest flows from one component to the next, each performing
a different task to complete the request. Monitoring such
an application requires both the collection of relevant data
and the analysis of the data to provide useful performance
statistics. The left part of Figure 2 categorizes most of the
existing solutions as they extract the information relevant
for monitoring at the end hosts.
Assessing the utilization of hardware resource for the in-
dividual components in terms of CPU, memory and I/O is
typically a first and straightforward step when analyzing per-
formance [6], and obviously, all related measures need to be
taken at the end hosts, where the components reside. How-
ever, performance issues are not always caused by hardware
bottlenecks, and there exist a wide range of high-level mea-
sures that are of interest, such as request service times for
individual components. This paper focuses on these higher-
level performance metrics.
One way to extract such high-level metrics is through
software instrumentation which typically creates explicit ap-
plication and/or platform specific log entries that then allow
to extract the high level measures such as request service
time [13, 18, 31, 33]. For instance, Apache Tomcat uses its pro-
prietary “Access Log Valve" to create log files. Any request
arriving at a Tomcat web application is passed to the access
log valve process as well, and the same applies for responses.
This allows the valve to calculate high-level measures such
as response times. Software instrumentation is an applica-
tion and/or platform dependent logging process. Obviously,
Tomcat valves can’t be used in a different servlet/JSP con-
tainer. Thus, software instrumentation will not support well
monitoring of complex multi-tier applications that execute
across various kinds of components.
Networkmonitoring tools can be used to observe andmon-
itor the message exchange between components. We refer to
them as the sniffers in Figure 2. Tools like Wireshark/Tshark
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or tcpdump are deployed at the end-host and can capture
relevant messages in real-time and very efficiently by using
message filtering at the interface to the application layer.
They then sniff the relevant data of filtered messages, mainly
the header information, and transform them into log entries.
Most typically, these log entries are then written to files.
Additionally Wireshark/Thsark provides quite sophisticated
analysis tools for these messages, and some of the metrics
provided are application relevant. One example is request
service time. Wirehshark/Tshark can calculate it by match-
ing an outgoing response message with the corresponding
incoming request message it has seen before and taking the
difference between the two capture times as the request
service time.
Software instrumentation tools and network monitoring
tools typically write their log entries to a file for offline
analysis, perform the analysis locally in real-time and send
the results for visualization (e.g., to a monitoring screen), or
send their log entries to a remote analysis tool. If the analysis
is done at the hosts, it might have a negative effect on the
resources available for the application itself, and dedicated
nodes will cause logging-related network traffic which might
affect the performance on the end host and the network.
3 Information Collection in the Network
A key observation about the network monitoring tools men-
tioned above is that they provide some application specific
measures by only looking at messages exchanged between
components. Thus, the work performed by these tools can
potentially also be done in the network. As messages travel
through the SDN switches, we argue that the switches can
potentially be programmed to perform work relevant to log
collection and analysis. In this and the next section we ex-
plore various alternatives to do so in detail. They are depicted
in the right side of Figure 2.
Port and selective mirroring are approaches that have
already been explored for network monitoring. What we
provide in this paper is a detailed analysis of their capabil-
ity to support application monitoring. The port sniffer is
a new approach that we propose in this paper. With this
approach the switch component has the flexibility to either
send information to an analysis tool or do it itself.
In the remainder of this section we provide an overview of
the principles of each of these approaches and describe what
exactly is done within the switch. The following section then
focuses on the analysis itself; that is, which parts of messages
are used to perform certain analysis and how the measures
can be calculated.
3.1 Selective port mirroring
Using port mirroring, the switch forwards all messages of
a flow not only to the indicated destination but also to a
secondary destination. Figure 3(a) shows an example of port
mirroring of all network traffic between application compo-
nent A1 and B1. As port mirroring runs with low priority,
the performance of mirroring may be degraded or in ex-
treme circumstances be temporarily suspended if there is
a lot of normal packet traffic. Port mirroring is very fast as
no copy process takes place but might have a significant
communication overhead as it mirrors all packets of a flow.
The application-performance monitoring framework devel-
oped in [21] uses port mirroring to forward a copy of all
packets of a flow of interest to a monitoring agent that then
extracts relevant information from messages of interest, and
performs the analysis.
Reducingmessage overhead The number of packets to be
mirrored can be reduced by using selective mirroring. We are
not aware of any application monitoring tool that currently
exploits selective mirroring. Selective mirroring uses the
filtering capability of OpenFlow compatible switches to copy
and forward only those network packets to the analysis tool
that match a predefined criteria, thus reducing the number
of packets to be transferred. Furthermore, messages can be
truncated so that only the first X bytes are mirrored, with X
being a parameter. Selective mirroring can be defined in the
switch through the flow rules.
For example, suppose that A1 in Figure 3(a) is a frontend
server, and B1 is the web server and we only want to mirror
data packages to the analysis tool as only those are relevant
to measure request service times. In order to avoid mirroring
many of the control messages that are sent from A1 to B1,
we can add two OpenFlow rules to B1’s TOR switch, one for
each flow direction (A1 to B1 and B1 to A1). The one that
captures the message flow from A1 to B1 would roughly look
like:
Conditions:
TCP-protocol,
Source IP = A1’s IP, Source Port = A1’s port,
Dest. IP = B1’s IP, Dest. port =8080,
TCP-Flags == ACK|PSH
Actions: Forward to B1 and Analysis Tool.
In this scenario, only messages where the ACK or the
PUSH flags are set are mirrored. In many of the control
messages, these flags are not set. Furthermore, if only the
header of a message is needed for the analysis, we can also
use additionally the truncation option to mirror only the
packet header, and avoid sending possibly large and mostly
irrelevant payloads to the analysis tool.
One has to note that selectivemirroring is coupledwith the
switch forwarding path as the OpenFlow rules are executed
at the time messages are processed to be sent to the actual
destination. This may lead to a processing overhead and thus,
delay in routing the message.
Furthermore, the OpenFlow rules only apply to the header
of the packets. A deep inspection is not possible. Thus, in
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Figure 3.Monitoring options in the Network
some cases one might have to send more packets than actu-
ally necessary as a fine-grained filtering might not be possi-
ble. We will discuss in the next section some of the options
and limitations of OpenFlow rules that would be relevant
for application monitoring.
A major disadvantage of mirroring and selective mirror-
ing is that the machine hosting the analysis tool has to be
directly connected to the switch. Mirroring does not change
the message to be mirrored, i.e., it keeps its original desti-
nation IP and port in its header. Thus, if the analysis tool is
not directly connected to the switch that performs mirroring
but the mirrored message is instead sent first to a further
switch, then this switch would actually forward the mirrored
message to the original destination; such a scenario is not
desirable. Furthermore, the machine that hosts the analysis
tool has to be put into a special mode as it has to be ready to
receive messages that are not addressed to it.
In the example in Figure 3(a), the switch to perform the
mirroring is the rack switch on which the analysis tool runs;
thus, there is a direct connection. Furthermore, in case of
software switches that connect components running actually
on the same physical machine, mirroring is also a possibility.
Tunneled selective mirroring If the analysis tool should
reside anywhere in the network, packet tunneling can be
used. Tunneling allows private network communications to
be sent across a public network, such as the Internet, through
a process called encapsulation. The encapsulation process
allows for network packets to appear as they are part of the
public network, allowing them to pass normally. Tunneling
has been used in the past for network monitoring such as
Everflow [39], yet we are not aware of research that would
exploit it for application monitoring.
Tunnels, in conjunction with OpenFlow, can be used to
create a virtual overlay network with its own addressing
scheme and topology [39]. Figure 3(b) shows an example
where the switch of B1 is programmed to tunnel messages
to the analysis tool. Tunneling protocols such as GRE [11] or
VXLAN [23] encapsulate network data and protocol infor-
mation in other network packet payload. An outer header
is added to allow the encapsulated packets to arrive at their
proper destination. At the final destination, de-capsulation
occurs and the original packet data is extracted. Figure 3(b)
illustrates this process, where the outer header contains the
Ethernet and IP headers of the sending switch and tunnel
destination, and the payload contains the original packet
(starting from the L2 header). As such, the mirrored packets
can be sent anywhere in the network and different packets
can be sent to different destinations.
To enable tunneling, the switch will be configured through
the OpenFlow rules to set up a tunnel between itself and
the host where the analysis tool resides. Then, OpenFlow
rules similar to the one described earlier in this section are
added to the switch in order to define the selection criteria
and encapsulate the network packets to send them through
the tunnel to the analysis tool. This happens for request
messages sent from A1 to B1 and for response messages from
B1 to A1. At the endpoint of the tunnel, i.e., the analysis tool,
first a de-capsulation has to take place before analysis can
be started on the original data packets.
3.2 Customizable Port Sniffer
While mirroring and selective mirroring are only capable of
forwarding (hopefully efficiently) relevant messages to an
analysis tool that then does the actual analysis, we propose
in this section a new approach that provides more flexibility
and allows the switch to perform some analysis locally. This
requires the switch to be a software switch, e.g. the one based
on OVS. We refer to this approach as port sniffer. Software
switches receive and send messages through ports. Thus,
a sniffer process can be deployed at the ports to inspect
all incoming and outgoing messages. This mechanism is
depicted in Figure 3(c). For instance, assuming that all ToRs in
Figure 1 are virtualized on computing nodes, a sniffer process
can be deployed on B1’s ToR switch host and instructed to
capture all traffic traversing the virtual switch port connected
to B1. This has conceptually similarity to what network
monitoring tools such as Wireshark/Tshark do.
The sniffer is an independent process on the node running
the software switch. In principle, the sniffer can implement
any kind of semantics; for example, the sniffer may simply
forward selective messages to an analysis tool, aggregate and
reformat logging messages that only contain information
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relevant for the analysis, or just perform the analysis by itself.
In principle, one could even deploy tools such as Wireshark
on the switch node. In our implementation, we follow a
flexible approach that allows a wide range of possibilities.
Our port sniffer separates the actual capturing of messages
from any additional tasks. The listener process keeps sniffing
on predefined switch ports, filters relevant messages, and
saves the needed traffic packets into a shared memory space.
From there, further extraction, analysis and forwarding are
performed by extra process(es) as needed. We have imple-
mented the listener in a separate process as it has to work
at the speed of the OVS ports. Thus, we wanted to make
the listener task as simple as possible, allow for straightfor-
ward multi-threading and avoid interference with analysis
functions.
For example, to measure HTTP service request times, the
listener process sniffs the OVS port that is connected to
the web server and filters the relevant traffic between client
and server (i.e., network packets with port 80 or 8080) to be
analyzed. From there, we have implemented two versions for
further processing. One performs the calculation of request
response time locallywithin an analysis process. In the second
version, the extract and forward process of the sniffer extracts
again the relevant information, determines timestamps and
data packets, but does not do the matching itself. Instead this
time the information is forwarded to a remote analysis tool,
similar in concept to what the selective mirroring is doing.
It uses UDP for that purpose.
4 Message Analysis
As pointed out above, considerable application relevant mea-
sures can be extracted by looking at message content pro-
viding information about the performance of the individual
components and the system overall. In this section we want
to motivate the possibilities by outlying some of the mea-
surements we can do through message inspection, and how
we have implemented them for the different approaches that
we presented above.
Request service time: In most component-based systems,
a component (or the client) uses a request/reply protocol to
call the service of a different component. In many of these
protocols, in particular http, a client connection to the server
can have at most one outstanding request; that is, a client
can only send a new request once it has received a response
for the outstanding request. Thus, by having access to the
flows from client to server and from server to client, one can
take the time difference between the observed request and
response as the request service time. If a client is allowed to
have multiple outstanding requests (as shown in Figure 4),
then one can simply assume that the first response refers to
the first request, the second response to the second request,
etc. In fact, as also the client needs to know to which request
to match a response, some servers guarantee that they will
Client ServerRequest 1
Response 1
M
at
ch
Response 2
Response 3
Request 2
Request 3
Figure 4. Request/response packet pair matching methodol-
ogy
send responses only in the order they received requests even
if they execute the requests concurrently.
Most request/reply protocols, including http, use TCP as
underlying communication mechanism. Thus, the header
information of messages follows TCP format, and the http (or
other protocol specific) headers are within the data payload.
Requests and responses could be spread across several TCP
messages. While unlikely, even the protocol specific header
could be spread across more than one TCP message. Thus,
we have to be careful of how we get the right messages.
• Using deep inspection: Deep inspection occurs when
we look at the message payload past the TCP header.
As TCP headers have a fixed size, it’s quite straight-
forward to perform deep inspection and extract the
protocol specific headers. Our port sniffer approach
performs such a deep inspection. It detects the TCP
packet that contains the last part of the http request
header for the flow from client to server, and the packet
that contains the last part of the http response header
for the flow from server to client. If analysis is done
within the sniffer, it then measures the time between
the arrival of these two packets. Otherwise, it simply
forwards this information to the analysis tool which
then takes the time difference between receiving these
two messages.
• Using TCP headers: Selective mirroring cannot do deep
inspection but has only access to the TCP headers.
Therefore, in our selective mirroring approach, our
filtering rules rely on the assumption that if a request
or reply message is split into n TCP-packets (n ≥ 1),
then in the last of these TCP packets, the TCP header
flag "PUSH" is set to true. We have confirmed that
this assumption holds for the http implementation we
have deployed. With this, our rules filter for each flow
direction only packets with
TCP-Flags == PSH
As a result, for both the request and the reply message,
exactly one packet is mirrored to the analysis tool, and
the analysis tool takes the time difference between
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receiving these two messages as the service request
time.
As we might want to observe many different connections
at the same time using selective mirroring, we have to typi-
cally define flow rules for each connection. However, some-
times, it is possible to define wildcards, e.g., to mirror all mes-
sages that are sent to a server independently of the sender.
In the analysis component, whether it resides within our
customizable port sniffer or is on a separate node, we have
to distinguish the messages from the different connections
of interest. Thus, when information about a request message
arrives it is stored in a connection specific data structure
until the response arrives. Only the time difference between
a request and its response needs to be kept track of. If several
requests are queued when a response arrives, the match is
done with the oldest request as depicted in Figure 4.
Note that the precision of the measurements might de-
pend on where timestamps are taken. For the mirroring ap-
proaches, the times are taken when the mirrored messages
arrive at the analysis tool. For port sniffing, the sniffer pro-
cess can take the time. In both cases, this is not the time when
the message was sent by the original source nor the time
the destination receives the message. For example, using
port sniffing, the time taken by the sniffer for the request is
before the message arrives at the server, and for the response
it is after the message is sent by the server. Our assumption
is that message delay times in the network are negligible
compared to request execution times, especially if the switch
in charge of mirroring or sniffing and the analysis tool are
close to the server under observation.
Aggregated request service times: Typically, administra-
tors are interested in aggregated information. It is quite easy
to calculate average, maximum and minimum service time
over an observation window. Or in case of long-lasting ob-
servations, values can be given periodically as aggregates
over predefined observation windows. Space and computa-
tion overhead to keep track of such aggregated information
for each connection under observation is very small; thus, it
should be possible to maintain them even at high throughput
rates.
Server Load: To measure the load of a specific server, the
filtering rules at the switch have to consider either all flows
where the server is the destination and then count the num-
ber of different requests per time interval, or consider all
flows where the server is the source, and then count the
number of different responses per time interval. When using
Openflow rules, we can use wildcards for the client IP to
cover more than one client.
Success Rate: Request/reply protocols typically have a sta-
tus code for each response message that identifies whether
it has been successfully processed or not. By comparing suc-
cessfully executed requests with all submitted requests, we
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Figure 5. Test application architecture
can easily calculate success rates. However, the status code
is part of the protocol header which is contained in the TCP
packet payload and not in the TCP header. Therefore, deep
packet inspection is required to extract the response status
code.
As such, for our selective mirroring approaches, as we
cannot do deep inspection, we have to make sure that we
sent all data packets to the analysis tool. Therefore, only
sending TCP packets where the PUSH flag is set is no more
sufficient, we need to send all data packets. Unfortunately,
there is no specific flag in the TCP header that would indicate
that a packet is a data packet and OpenFlow also does not
allow to specify a rule that would allow us to filter only
packets that have a non-empty payload. Therefore, we filter
all packets that either have the ACK or the PUSH flag set.
In our observations, all data packets have the ACK flag set
(thus, we should not miss any of them), and most ACKs are
piggypacked on data packets (therefore, we should hopefully
not send too many unnecessary messages.
Frequency of requests for individual objects/methods:
As HTTP request messages contain the full URL, we can eas-
ily keep track of the number of requests per URL, calculating
frequencies on an interval basis. For this, we simply have to
parse the first line of the HTTP header. Again, this requires
deep inspection of the packets.
5 Evaluation
In this section we present an evaluation of the approaches
presented in the previous section and compare their perfor-
mance also with some of the approaches deployed at the
end hosts. Table 1 provides characteristics of each evaluated
monitoring approach such as application/platform depen-
dency, where information capturing takes place, whether the
data collection and analysis are done at the same location,
and what the output is provided by our implementation.
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Table 1. A list of evaluated Monitoring Approaches along with their characteristics
Monitoring approach Application dependent Deployment location Onsite analysis? Output
Tomcat logging Yes server host Yes Dump analysis results to end-host file
Tshark No server host Yes Dump analysis results to end-host file
Tcpdump No server host No Dump captured data to end-host file
Customized OVS sniffer No OVS host Yes/No Onsite: dump analysis result to OVS host file,
Offsite: dump captured data to analysis file
Port mirroring No OVS host No Dump captured data to analysis file
Selective mirroring No OVS host No Dump captured data to analysis file
Truncated mirroring No OVS host No Dump captured data to analysis file
Tunneling-GRE No OVS host No Dump captured data to analysis file
Tunneling-VXLAN No OVS host No Dump captured data to analysis file
5.1 Details of the Monitoring Approaches
For a platform-specific software instrumentation at the end
host, we enabled the access log valve in Apache Tomcat
server to log HTTP request service times. We refer to this as
Tomcat in the performance graphs. For networking monitor-
ing tools deployed at the web-server host, we use Tshark, the
command line interface to Wireshark, and tcpdump. With
Tshark, we can do the analysis in an online fashion, i.e.,
Tshark sniffs the messages, analyzes requests and either
visualizes them or logs them to a file. Visualization was con-
siderably more expensive. Thus, our evaluations show the
overhead when results are dumped to a file. Tcpdump is
only a message capturing tool with filtering capability. Such
capability is only used to filter messages that are relevant
for the analysis. Tcpdump does not have an analysis engine,
and is thus only instructed to dump all packets to/from the
web-server port to a disk file, that can be fed into any offline
analysis tool.
For network-level application monitoring, we have evalu-
ated port mirroring, selective port mirroring with and with-
out truncation, tunneling using GRE/VXLAN and our cus-
tomized OVS port sniffer. As both tunneling approaches have
very similar performance results, we only show VXLAN in
the graphs for better readability. For all approaches except of
our OVS sniffer, the mirrored packets are sent to the analysis
tool. For our customized OVS sniffer, we show the results
when the OVS sniffer performs the analysis itself and when
it sends relevant data to the analysis tool (similar to what
the selective mirroring approaches do). The remote analysis
tool used for mirroring and by our OVS sniffer actually only
dumps all the messages it receives to a file without further
analysis. We do so because in our setup the analysis tool
resides on the same physical machine as the web server. To
avoid indirect effect to the web-server we have tried to keep
the overhead as small as possible.
5.2 Implementation Environment
Our basis for evaluation has been the YCSB benchmark on an
extended architecture as depicted in Figure 5. While YCSB is
originally a database benchmark where a YCSB client sends
requests to a database, our extended version has added a
Tomcat webserver as frontend for the client (which was mod-
ified to communicate with the webserver); the webserver
has access to a MySQL database and a Memcache server. All
components are connected by an OVS switch configured
via Openflow. The clients submit a predefined workload of
HTTP requests to the web server whereby each request re-
trieves data from either the database or the memory cache.
Recent results are cached in the Memcache server. The data-
base schema and the query requests follow the YCSB bench-
mark. A separate analysis tool component is used for some
of the evaluated approaches.
The experiments are performed using DELL hosts with
dual Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1220 v5 @ 3.00GHz CPUs (4
cores per socket),a Broadcom NetXtreme BCM5720 Giga-
bit Ethernet Dual Port NIC, and 32.8GB memory, with the
clients on one machine and all server components on an-
other machine together with the OVS software switch. This
resembles the scenario where the cloud provider has large
end-host machines that host many components. Each server
component runs in their own docker container (docker-ce
version 18.03.1) with predefined available resources and on
separate cores. All docker containers are connected by 10
Gigabit Ethernet OVS ports. We used OVS version 2.9.90.
16GB of RAM are assigned to the cache and the backend
database system is MySQL 5.7.24.
In order to compare the performance of different moni-
toring approaches, we run our YCSB benchmark with and
without monitoring. We then measure the overhead for each
of the monitoring approaches by analyzing the client per-
ceived performance. That is, we check how the different
approaches affect the throughput and the latency observed
at the clients. We also gauge CPU utilization for each moni-
toring approach and how OVS forwarding performance is
affected in case of the network-based approaches.
For our experiments, we chose the YCSB read only work-
load with 3 million scan requests and zipfian distribution for
records selection over a 10GB database (10 million records).
Each test scenario runs that workload for two minutes and
the results are averaged for 5 runs. We tested with up to
8
30 client threads (after which the web-server was saturated
even without monitoring enabled).
5.3 Application throughput and latency
Here we examine the impact of monitoring on the through-
put and latency at the YCSB client. Ideally, monitoring has
little to no impact on the performance observed at the client
side. Figure 6 shows the end-to-end throughput and latency
observed by the YCSB client with andwithout the integration
of the various monitoring approaches and while increasing
the workload, i.e., adding more client threads.
Of all approaches, Tomcat works the best having nearly no
negative impact on performance. This is because the access
log valve does not need to perform any sophisticatedmessage
analysis; instead, likely through interception, it only records
the time before the web-server starts processing a request
and once it has completed, and then logs the time difference
as service time. This is only possible because the valve is
tightly integrated into Tomcat’s software. The other two end-
host mechanisms, both application independent, negatively
affect performance. Tcpdump has much lower impact than
Tshark, though. For example, with 20 clients tcpdump has 5%
lower throughput compared to no monitoring while Tshark
has 40% less throughput. This might be because tcpdump
does not perform any analysis; it could also just be that
Tshark has generally not an efficient implementation.
All the network-based approaches perform significantly
better than Tshark in terms of both throughput and response
time (by at least 15% for response time, and 30% for through-
put). In terms of throughput selective mirroring with trun-
cating is at least 5% worse than all other approaches (except
of Tshark). Selective mirroring and tunneling are only in-
significantly slower than tcpdump (by 1%). In contrast, the
throughput of port mirroring and our OVS sniffer solutions
are as good as that of Tomcat.
These are very promising results. Note that tcpdump stores
the logged messages locally and the file needs to be retrieved
from there before analysis takes place. In contrast, for the
network-based approaches, we send all the relevant informa-
tion to the remote analysis tool for online analysis or even
perform the analysis on the fly such as Tshark.
To understand the performance differences and have a
full picture, we look at resource consumption and the delay
induced by mirroring at the OVS as well as some of the
implementation details in the next sections.
5.4 Computational Overhead
Figure 7(a) shows the CPU overhead of the analysis tool pro-
cess, again with increasing number of clients. With Tomcat
and Tshark, the analysis runs in the same docker as the web-
server. With OVS sniffer, the analysis tool resides within the
OVS host, and for the rest of the network-based approaches,
the analysis tool resides in its own docker. We used Linux top
command to measure the CPU utilization of each running
process inside the webserver and analysis tool dockers.
Figure 7(a) shows that Tshark has the highest CPU utiliza-
tion and runs at full capacity. As the webserver docker is
assigned to only one core in our experiments, Tshark shares
such a core with the webserver process. Tshark consumes
on average about 27% of the CPU resources of the webserver
docker. This is the reason for the poor client-perceived perfor-
mance. Note that Tshark has serious performance problems
and frequently crashed during experiments. In addition, it
also missed messages at higher rates.
Our OVS onsite sniffer performs the analysis locally and
writes it to a local file; it consumes 10% of the OVS host
CPU resources, which is much more efficient than Tshark.
This may be because it does overall less analysis than Tshark.
We note, however, that in our evaluation tests, we enabled
only the Tshark analysis features that correspond to the
ones performed in our OVS sniffer. Nonetheless, the OVS
sniffer requires more CPU time than approaches that only
dump data such as tcpdump which is very much expected.
Interestingly, when the OVS sniffer only reformats messages
and sends them to a remote analysis tool, it requires on
average about 6% more CPU utilization compared to the
onsite sniffer version. It seems like creating messages and
sending them to a remote site is more CPU intensive than
performing the analysis locally.
Generally, the CPU overhead is very low when messages
are simply dumped to a file, about 1% or less. The overhead
is lower with selective mirroring than with port mirroring or
for tcpdump, because the analysis tool only receives a subset
of all messages with selective mirroring . This will be further
validated by the communication overhead measurement in
upcoming subsection.
Figure 7(b) shows the effect of sharing the webserver re-
sources with the monitoring tool in traditional application
monitoring approaches. The CPU percentage taken for the
monitoring tool is deducted from the webserver process
CPU resources, which diminishes throughput as shown in
the previous subsections. The webserver CPU resources are
decreased by 0.7%, 3% and 30% for Tomcat, tcpdump, and
Tshark; respectively.
5.5 Switch overhead
In this subsection we compare the performance of port mir-
roring, selective mirroring, truncated mirroring and tunnel-
ing in terms of their impact on the OVS forwarding perfor-
mance. To do that, we use Iperf [9] to measure core link
performance. We deploy the Iperf server, the Iperf client and
an analysis tool process, each in a separate docker container,
all connected through 10 Gigabit Ethernet OVS ports. We
work within a single host as the focus is on the performance
of the OVS software. We run experiments with up to 10
concurrent client connections.
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(a) Average throughput (transactions/second) reported by YCSB client
(b) Average latency reported by YCSB client
Figure 6. Application throughput and latency using various monitoring approaches
(a) Analysis tool CPU utilization (b)Web server CPU utilization
Figure 7. CPU overhead for different monitoring approaches
Figure 8 shows forwarding latency when 10 clients are
directly connected with the server (no OVS), using OVS
without any mirroring or tunneling, using OVS with port,
selective and truncated mirroring, and using OVS with tun-
neling (VXLAN) to the analysis tool. As expected, direct
connections without OVS perform best. OVS adds around
1.5 microseconds latency. Port mirroring, selective mirroring
and tunneling are only slightly worse than OVS. Truncated
mirroring is the slowest.
With this, we can see that adding rules to OVS and even
reformatting messages, as needed by tunneling, only add
very little overhead to OVS. Therefore, the client-perceived
performance impact that we discussed in Figure 6 is so small.
However, truncating messages has a serious impact on the
switch latency. In fact, not shown in a figure, the OVS CPU
utilization is also 50 times higher for truncated mirroring
compared to the other mirroring approaches.
5.6 Impact of Implementation
In general, for all network-based logging approaches, there
is a delay induced by copying messages, but in different con-
texts. As we mentioned before, in port mirroring, selective
Figure 8. OVS link latency impact of different network-
based monitoring approaches
mirroring and tunnelling, the switch itself makes a copy of
the captured packets to another defined port. In our snif-
fer, the kernel makes the packet copy for the monitoring
application. The packet capturing is done by inserting some
filtering code (such as BPF [19]) into the kernel at run time;
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this code will copy each incoming packet at the monitored
port and send it to a buffer where the userspace monitor-
ing middleware (such as our customized sniffer, tcpdump,
tshark, etc.) will read the buffer and get the packets. Figure 9
illustrates this process. While testing the customized sniffer,
we have noticed an increase of kernel processing time. Thus,
although with our port sniffer, the copying process is not
in the OVS forwarding path to the original destination, we
believe that such extra copying time in the kernel has an
indirect impact on the delivery rate of the packets, and thus,
also on the client-perceived performance.
5.7 Communication overhead
In this subsection, we analyze the communication overhead
induced by mirroring messages to a remote analysis tool.
We have collected the number of received packets and bytes
at the analysis node while running YCSB with 20 clients.
Figures 10(a) and 10(b) show the number of transmitted
packets (in 1000) and the total number ofMBytes transmitted;
respectively.
Figure 10(a) shows that port mirroring transmits the most
packets to the analysis tool as it mirrors all packets over
the monitored link. The OVS offsite analysis sniffer trans-
mits the least number of packets to the analysis node as it
sends exactly one packet for each http request and response
message. With this, it sends less than 12% of the number of
packages sent with port mirroring. The selective mirroring
variants transmit all similar number of packets because they
use the same filtering switch Openflow rules. Compared to
port mirroring, they have around 30% less messages.
Figure10(b) illustrates the number of MBytes sent for these
approaches. For truncated mirroring, we have tested two sce-
narios. In the first scenario, we mirror only the TCP headers,
in the second we mirror additional bytes to guarantee that
the payload containing the http header is also sent to the
analysis tool to allow for deep inspection as needed for mea-
suring, e.g., success rate, as discussed in Section 4.
Figure 10(b) shows selective forwarding and tunneling
via vxlan send only 5% respectively 6% less bytes than port
mirroring although they send 30% less packets. The reason
is that these approaches avoid control messages that are
typically small in size. Furthermore, vxlan adds some bytes
to each packet for encapsulation (i.e. layer 3, 4 and vxlan
headers) which leads to more bytes than selective mirroring.
The two truncated mirroring approaches send around 95%
fewer bytes compared to mirroring the whole packet because
the TCP header is only about 5% of the maximum segment
size of TCP packets. Still, our OVS offsite analysis sniffer
sends the least amount of bytes, only 1.25% of what port
mirroring sends. The reason is that it is customized and
extracts only the target fields to be sent to the analysis node.
5.8 Summary
Conducting complex application-independent analysis on
the end host, as done by Tshark, can have a considerable
negative impact on application performance. Network-based
application monitoring approaches decouple log collection
and analysis from the end components, allow for flexible
placement of data collection and even analysis somewhere
in the network.
Port mirroring has shown better performance than tun-
neling in our experiments as it introduces less overhead in
the switch. However, port mirroring produces more traffic,
which may negatively affect the overall cloud performance
should the analysis tool resides on a different node than
the switch. Port mirroring also boosts the load on the anal-
ysis tool by increasing the number of messages that have
to be processed; this is quite evident by the growth in of
CPU utilization. Selective mirroring and tunneling reduces
slightly this communication overhead. Truncated mirroring
has the least communication overhead between mirroring
approaches. However, it has significant impact of the switch
latency and CPU utilization.
Compared to mirroring and tunneling, the OVS sniffer
has the advantages that: (a) it does not introduce any direct
delay at the switch, and (b) it can perform some analysis
locally or send selective information for remote analysis
which significantly reduces the communication overhead.
The disadvantage of the OVS sniffer is that it can be only
implemented in software and not on SDN-enabled hardware
switches.
We believe that a network approach provides us consider-
ably more flexibility in the placement of monitoring function-
ality. For hardware switches, selective mirroring is probably
the most efficient approach if the analysis tool resides on
a node that has a direct link to this switch, but tunneling
provides flexibility for location of analysis tool that is proba-
bly worth the overhead. For software switches, we believe
that our customized OVS sniffer is the preferred route to go
because of performance and flexibility.
6 Related work
Monitoring has always been a fundamental aspect of dis-
tributed systems and large-scale networks and the literature
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(a) Number of packets received by analysis tool (b) Number of MBytes received by analysis tool
Figure 10. Communication overhead when the analysis is conducted by a remote tool
is vaste. Yet, to the best of our knowledge none of the existing
work exploits the functionality of SDN to enable effective
and efficient application-level monitoring.
Applicationmonitoring via instrumentation: Many frame-
works use instrumentation [13, 18, 22, 31, 33, 36, 38]. For
instance, Twitter [18] instruments its code to generate struc-
tured client event log messages. The log messages keep track
of session information such as the client ID, IP address and
request receiving time. The generated log messages can be
later used for application performance measures such as re-
quest service time. Another example is SAAD [13], which
uses log statements as trace points to track the execution
flow of tasks during run-time, and exploits the statistical sim-
ilarity of tasks to detect performance anomalies. However,
the use of instrumentation and application-dependent logs
for analysis relies on experts with deep knowledge of the
system, and can not be generally applied in larger settings.
Application monitoring using SDN: There has been lit-
tle work that exploits network functionality for application
monitoring. NetAlytics [20] is deemed the closest to our
work. NetAlytics deploys analysis nodes, called monitoring
agents, across the cloud network and connects them directly
to the TOR SDN switches. These switches then apply port
mirroring to collect data for conducting real-time analysis
at the monitoring agents. The main focus is on analyzing
traffic that arrives at the monitor in real-time by developing
specific parsers and a query language that allows to specify
which flows need to be monitored and how. In this paper, we
have a closer look at the forwarding mechanisms in the net-
work themselves as well as analyze the option of conducting
some of the analysis at the switch using an OVS sniffer.
Network monitoring using SDN: Network monitoring
using SDN has been extensively studied [3, 14, 26, 28, 39].
Everflow [39] utilizes the match and mirror capability in
commodity switches to capture certain packets for network
monitoring purpose (debug DCN faults). In this paper, we
investigated the possibility and effectiveness of adapting the
same approach but for application-level performance metrics
such as HTTP request service time. Selective tunneling has
been one of several approaches analyzed earlier in this paper
in the context of application monitoring.
Some approaches use port sniffing for monitoring pur-
poses [7, 20, 29, 32, 40]. For example, NefPerf [27] sniffs
packets on all communication paths between NFVs in NFV
deployments to compute per-hop throughput and delays,
and uses these measurements to identify both hardware and
software performance bottlenecks. Our port sniffer has the
same goals but with more focus on enabling application mon-
itoring and supporting metrics such as the ones described in
Section 4.
Switch software enhancements: A further alternative to
extend monitoring in the switch is to extend the switch soft-
ware to include advanced analysis functionality [4, 10, 15,
25, 34, 37]. However, performance evaluations of these ap-
proaches have shown considerable overhead and impact on
the performance of the switch’s main task – packet forward-
ing. Also, this requires extensions to the switch’s code base.
Thus, there are concerns on the adoption of these approaches
in practice. Specifically, the authors of [4] extend the Open-
Flow architecture to be able to inspect the payload of the
packets by inserting a set of predefined string patterns into
the switch. Mekky et al. [25] augment SDN switches with
application processing logic defined in a table called applica-
tion table. This enables customized packet handling in the
SDN data plane switch. Both approaches can handle signifi-
cantly less packets per time unit than standard switches. The
approach of both [34] and [37] is to modify the OVS source
code in order to decouple the monitoring functions from the
forwarding path of OVS. UMON [34] decouples monitoring
from forwarding by defining a monitoring flow table in the
OpenFlow switch user space to separate monitoring rules
from forwarding rules. Zha el al. [37] extends the kernel
space of OVS to buffer the monitored packets into a ring
buffer to be picked up by the monitoring process. However,
both approaches are meant for network layer measurements
and do not support any application level measurements.
7 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have explored the various trade-offs of dif-
ferent host and network based logging of monitoring data.
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In addition, we have proposed and implemented a network-
based logging approach and provided a quantitative compar-
ison. The results show that sniffer tools on end-hosts can
create considerable overhead. In contrast network-based ap-
proaches enable a flexible deployment and analysis. The use
of SDN keeps the overhead induced by the data collection
process at low levels. Virtualized switches further enhance
the possibilities of what can be done at the network compo-
nents.
As a next step, wewill evaluate architectures with top-rack
OVS based switches that build on fast packet processing li-
braries. Furthermore, wewill explore further high-level appli-
cation monitoring functions to build a complete Monitoring-
as-a-Service of the network.
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